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INTRODUCTION
At the end of its 2001 Term, the Supreme Court settled one of the most
contentious educational debates in recent history, ruling in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris that the inclusion of religious schools in a state school
voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.' There are, however, complex constitutional questions about
vouchers that linger in Zelman's wake. This Note addresses one such issue
that has only just begun to receive scholarly attention: Can states require
private voucher schools-including religious schools-to comply with
antidiscrimination policies, or would the enforcement of those policies
violate the First Amendment rights of the schools?2 For example, could a
state require a private school to admit racial minorities, women, and gays
and lesbians as a condition for eligibility in a state voucher program? What
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Recent work on this topic includes Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 235, 254-59
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 972-82 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 22-29; and Bonnie Daboll, Note, School-Choice Legislation: Constitutional
Limitations on State Regulation of Participating Parochial Schools After Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 55 FLA. L. REV. 711, 725-28 (2003). See generally MARK G. YUDOF ET AL.,
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 75-98 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing legal issues surrounding
discrimination in private education).
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if the school administrators object on principle-perhaps religious
principle-to racial integration, coeducational schooling, or homosexuality?
Doesn't the First Amendment protect the schools' views?
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence does not provide easy answers to
these questions, and the relevant body of case law is inconsistent. This Note
seeks to make sense of the doctrine and to demonstrate that, as applied to
private voucher schools, antidiscrimination laws can-and should-survive
a First Amendment challenge.
3
Part I provides a brief overview of the current status of voucher laws
and proposals, and discusses the opposition of civil rights organizations to
these laws. Part II then analyzes the free speech problems that may arise if
states require voucher schools to adhere to antidiscrimination norms. I
argue first that voucher programs are a form of "government speech
through private actors," and that in such cases the Free Speech Clause does
not preclude states from making viewpoint-based distinctions. The
remainder of Part II deals with the possibility that courts will reject this
analysis. I discuss the various constitutional tests to which courts may
subject antidiscrimination requirements, and I argue that antidiscrimination
policies should survive any of them. Because the Free Speech Clause poses
the most complex problems for antidiscrimination policies, the bulk of the
Note centers on this issue.
Part III addresses issues raised by the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, and argues that religious voucher schools can also be bound to
antidiscrimination policies without violating the schools' First Amendment
freedoms. The only exception would be for clerical teacher employment
disputes at religious schools; such suits are nonjusticiable due to a mixture
of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns.4
3. This Note deals exclusively with private voucher schools. Charter schools-another form
of school choice-are considered public schools, and thus present an entirely different range of
constitutional questions.
4. The focus of this Note is on the First Amendment rights of the voucher schools that wish to
discriminate against certain groups of children or teachers. The question of whether voucher
antidiscrimination laws violate the constitutional rights of parents is entirely separate. The Court
has recognized a parental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to enroll a child in a private-as
opposed to a public-school. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). But Pierce did not create an expansive right, and the Court made the
limits on that right patently clear from the very beginning:
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools .... to require that... teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
Id. at 534. Subsequent cases have left equally clear that parents do not have a right to provide any
sort of education they please, much less a right to have their state-funded school discriminate
against people that the parents disfavor. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976)
(stressing "the limited scope of Pierce, which simply affirmed the right of private schools to exist
and to operate" (citation omitted)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972)
(White, J., concurring) (explaining that Pierce "lends no support to the contention that parents
may replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views"). It is therefore
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1. VOUCHER SCHOOLS AND THE OPPOSITION OF
CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS: AN OVERVIEW
Though programs may differ in many ways, the basic structure of a
voucher program is simple: The state offers parents-typically only
low-income parents-government vouchers that can be used to pay for their
children's education at eligible private schools within the state. The state
pays for the vouchers with the public tax dollars that would otherwise pay
for those students' public education. The flow of money from the
government to the private schools is indirect: The voucher money passes
first into the hands of parents, who then direct the funds to the private
schools of their choice.5
The voucher movement has produced odd coalitions. Some liberals and
advocates for minority youth, frustrated by the failures of public schools,
have joined with conservatives eager to secure public funding for religious
education to form a unique and diverse political coalition. In opposition
stand mainstream civil rights groups, teachers' unions, and suburban
parents wishing to maintain the status quo.
6
Advocates claim that vouchers are one solution to the failures of public
education and that they rightly give poor parents the same options that
wealthy parents already have. 7 Opponents claim that vouchers provide only
a false hope, drain money from financially strapped public schools, and
facilitate racial segregation.
8
In opposing vouchers, a wide array of civil rights and educational
groups have also expressed concern that participating schools will be free to
discriminate against disfavored groups, such as racial and religious
minorities, women, and gays and lesbians. Organizations such as the
National Education Association, the National PTA, the American Civil
not surprising that the scholars addressing the voucher antidiscrimination question have generally
focused on the rights of schools, not parents. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 972-82; Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 22-29; Daboll, supra note 2, at 725-28. But see Choper, supra note 2, at 254-59
(arguing that in some circumstances regulation of voucher schools could violate parental rights).
5. The indirect nature of the funding is important in ensuring compliance with the
Establishment Clause, but it does not change the fact that the schools, not the parents, are the
entities regulated by antidiscrimination law. See infra note 63.
6. For discussions of the political coalitions in the voucher movement, see James E. Ryan &
Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 11l YALE L.J. 2043, 2078-85 (2002).
See also TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 254-55 (2001).
7. See, e.g., KRISTA KAFER, HERITAGE FOUND., D.C. SCHOLARSHIP PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE
STUDENTS ACCESS TO QUALITY SCHOOLS (2003), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Education/Bg 1671 .cfm.
8. See, e.g., TAMMY JOHNSON ET AL., APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., VOUCHERS: A TRAP, NOT A
CHOICE: CALIFORNIA SCHOOL VOUCHERS WILL INCREASE RACIAL INEQUALITY (2000), at
http://www.arc.org/erase/vouchers/voucherreport.pdf; Jay Matthews, Bush Pushes Vouchers, D.C.
Charters, WASH. POST, July 2, 2003, at Al; People for the Am. Way, PFAW on Capitol Hill:
Vouchers vs. Public Education, http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=9855 (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003).
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Liberties Union, the National Alliance of Black School Educators, and the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights have criticized voucher legislation
for authorizing government-funded discrimination. 9 The Gay, Lesbian and
Straight Education Network has warned that under most voucher programs,
"a private school could theoretically expel a student because of his or her
sexual orientation," and that participating schools "would not be required to
protect any LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender] student from
in-school harassment."' 0 The Anti-Defamation League has adopted a
particularly alarmist tone, claiming that "the proud legacy of Brown v.
Board of Education may be tossed away as tax dollars are siphoned off to
deliberately segregated schools.""
Given the current state of voucher programs and proposals, the fears
expressed by these organizations should come as no surprise. Most voucher
legislation-whether already enacted or only proposed-contains only
limited antidiscrimination protections. Consider, for example, the four
existing voucher statutes that allow for the participation of religious
schools. Ohio's statute only requires that participating schools "not
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background."' 12 It
further mandates that schools not "teach hatred of any person or group on
the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion."' 3 Florida's program
requires schools to comply with Title VI, which only bans discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin.14 Wisconsin's voucher statute
contains the same requirement.1 5 Civil rights advocates in Wisconsin have
been unsuccessful in their repeated efforts to include a more comprehensive
antidiscrimination policy in that state's voucher law, despite the fact that
Wisconsin public schools are held to one of the most expansive
antidiscrimination laws in the nation.16 Colorado's voucher law-the most
9. See Letter from the American Association of School Administrators et al.,
National Coalition for Public Education, to the Committee on Education and the Workforce,
U.S. House of Representatives (July 23, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/ReligiousLiberty/
ReligiousLiberty.cfm?ID=10550&c=140 (stating that a bill to establish vouchers in the District of
Columbia "authorizes federally funded discrimination").
10. GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, PARENTAL "CHOICE," SCHOOL "CHOICE,"
AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS 121, http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENARTICLES/pdf file/
695.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
11. Anti-Defamation League, Vouchers Undermine Public Schools, at http://www.adl.org/
vouchers/vouchers_publicschools.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(4) (Anderson 2002).
13. Id. § 3313.976(A)(6).
14. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(4)(c) (West, WESTLAW through 2003 Reg. Sess. &
Spec. Sess. A-D) (requiring compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).
15. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a)(4) (West 1999).
16. See id. § 118.13(1) (prohibiting discrimination against students in public schools on the
basis of "sex, race, religion, national origin, ancestry, creed, pregnancy, marital or parental status,
sexual orientation or physical, mental, emotional or learning disability"); see also People for the
Am. Way, Facts About Vouchers, at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=5473
(last visited Nov. 7, 2003) (describing failed attempts to expand the antidiscrimination policy
covering voucher schools in Wisconsin).
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recently enacted of voucher laws-bans discrimination in participating
schools only on the basis of "race, color, religion, national origin, or
disability."' 17 A vague but potentially expansive provision of Colorado's law
also bans schools from "teach[ing] hatred of any person or group."' 8
Most proposed voucher bills include civil rights protections that would
ban discrimination by voucher schools on the basis of race and national
origin but do not contain provisions banning discrimination based on
religion or sexual orientation.' 9 One obvious explanation for this pattern is
that discrimination against religious groups or gays and lesbians is more
often considered justified by religious teachings, and legislators wish to
respect religious schools' rights to free exercise of religion. Another
obvious explanation for the exclusion of sexual orientation is simply that in
many parts of the country such discrimination is still socially and politically
acceptable, regardless of whether there is a religious motivation. Despite
these obstacles, legislators concerned about civil rights have not given up
on efforts to include classifications like religion and sexual orientation in
voucher laws.2°
Voucher legislation also tends not to ban discrimination based on sex,2'
perhaps because of the common-though certainly not universal-
acceptance of single-sex schools as consistent with antidiscrimination
norms. Some voucher legislation not only lacks civil rights protections
altogether, but also includes provisions that could, among other things,
affirmatively protect a school's "right" to discriminate. For example,
voucher legislation proposed in Kansas includes a provision stating that
"[n]othing in this act shall be applied or construed in any manner so as to
regulate or prohibit free exercise in matters of curriculum, creed or practice
of any nonpublic Kansas school of choice. 22
Opposition to vouchers is driven not only by legislators' tendency to
exclude comprehensive antidiscrimination provisions from voucher
proposals, but also by a fear that private schools would be constitutionally
exempted from antidiscrimination policies even if legislatures attempted to
impose them. The First Amendment protects expressive association and, as
17. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-56-106(b) (West Supp. 2003).
18. Id. § 22-56-106(c).
19. See, e.g., H.R. 1691, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003) (banning discrimination
by participating voucher schools on the basis of race, color, or national origin); H.R. 1771, 2003
Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) (banning discrimination by participating voucher schools on the basis
of race, religion, or ethnicity); H.R. 27, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2002) (same).
20. See H.R. 19, 2003 Leg., 105th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003) (banning harassment and
discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, sex or gender,
disability, or sexual orientation); S. 274, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002) (banning
discrimination by participating voucher schools on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, gender,
marital status, pregnancy, sexual orientation, or disability); Assem. Res. 716, 95th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2001) (same).
21. See sources cited supra notes 12, 14-15, 17-19.
22. S. 211, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2003).
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the Supreme Court has recently held, this may include discriminatory
conduct. a3 Would voucher schools therefore be constitutionally immune
from antidiscrimination regulations? In addressing this issue, I turn first to
the Free Speech Clause.
II. FREE SPEECH AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES
A. Overview of the Free Speech Problem
Though the weight of the precedent is now unclear, the Supreme Court
has upheld the government's authority to impose antidiscrimination policies
on private schools. Language from two opinions in particular would seem
to suggest, at first, that there is no conflict at all between free speech rights
and a requirement that voucher schools adhere to antidiscrimination norms.
In Runyon v. McCrary, two African-American students challenged
a private school's policy of denying admission to blacks.2 The
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private, commercially
operated, nonsectarian schools from discriminating on the basis of race in
admissions. In so holding, the Court flatly rejected the school's contention
that § 1981, as applied, violated its constitutionally protected rights of free
association:
[T]he Court has recognized a First Amendment right to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas ....
From this principle it may be assumed that parents have a First
Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions
that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that
the children have an equal right to attend such institutions. But it
does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from
such institutions is also protected by the same principle.... [T]he
Constitution... places no value on discrimination, and while
[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form
of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment... it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections.25
Eight years later, the Court reaffirmed this principle in Hishon v.
King & Spalding, stating that "[t]here is no constitutional right... to
discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a
23. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
24. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
25. Id. at 175-76 (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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labor union. 26 Hishon and Runyon seem to establish quite clearly that
antidiscrimination laws can be constitutionally applied to voucher schools.
However, subsequent developments in First Amendment law have left the
force of these decisions unclear. The Runyon Court emphatically stated that
"[i]nvidious private discrimination" had "never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections. 27 But this is simply no longer true. In 2000, the
Supreme Court held that the free speech right of expressive association
exempted the Boy Scouts of America from New Jersey's public
accommodations law banning discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.28 Though the majority made no mention of Runyon, the opinion
is in obvious tension with Runyon's First Amendment holding. In Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, the Boy Scouts terminated the adult membership
of an openly gay Eagle Scout, James Dale, on the ground that the
organization "specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals., 29 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey had held that scouting constituted a public
accommodation subject to the state's antidiscrimination law and had
rejected the Boy Scouts' claim that the First Amendment exempted it as a
private organization from that law. 30 The Supreme Court reversed. The
Court found that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive association and that
its membership policy was protected by the First Amendment. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, accorded deference to the Scouts'
assertion that Dale's inclusion in the organization would significantly and
adversely affect the Scouts' message.3' Given the effects of Dale's
membership on the Scouts' message and purpose, the organization had a
constitutional right to exclude him. As the Chief Justice wrote, "The forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom
of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a
significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints."321t is still unclear how broad Dale's reach will be. If it does
extend into the realm of private schools, the consequences for
antidiscrimination laws and voucher programs may be enormous. Voucher
schools, like the Boy Scouts, may argue that their discriminatory practices
entail the constitutionally protected expression of their viewpoints, and that
this free expression may not be burdened or disfavored by the government.
In responding to this Free Speech Clause problem, I divide the analysis
into several parts. The first part, Section II.B, addresses the question of
26. 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
27. 427 U.S. at 176 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
29. Id. at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1222-29 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
640.
31. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
32. Id. at 648.
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whether close First Amendment scrutiny can be avoided by placing voucher
programs into the special category of "government speech through private
actors." I answer this question in the affirmative. Because the government
funds private schools for the purpose of communicating government
messages, the state has significant leeway in choosing which activities to
subsidize or exclude from its programs.
Sections II.C, II.D, and II.E of the free speech analysis address
what could happen if courts reject this government-speech argument.
Section II.C analyzes the possibility that courts will designate voucher
programs as limited public or nonpublic fora. Section II.D addresses
whether antidiscrimination requirements could be subject to heightened
scrutiny, and more importantly, whether they could survive such scrutiny.
Section II.E discusses an alternative, deferential approach that the Supreme
Court has begun to take in certain kinds of government-futding cases-an
approach that allows for content- and viewpoint-based distinctions by the
government. Finally, Section II.F briefly compares these approaches and
argues that the first and last are the most sensible routes to follow.
B. Voucher Programs as Government Speech
The fact that regulations might apply only to those private entities
receiving state funds does not immunize the regulations from constitutional
scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies in
the subsidy context, though the rules are somewhat different.33 On the other
hand, if it is the government that is speaking, a completely different analysis
controls the inquiry, even if the government speaks through private actors.
But if private actors can engage in government speech, how are we to
distinguish between government speech and private speech?
To understand the answer to this question, we must delve into the thick
"morass" 34 of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, an area of law that is
"notorious" for its "haphazard inconsistencies. 35 The central principle in
this doctrine is that states may not condition a government benefit on the
relinquishment of a constitutional right. Such conditions are especially
pernicious when combined with content-based or viewpoint-based
discrimination. A particularly egregious example would be a requirement
that a person forego his right to express views critical of the government as
a condition for receiving a tax exemption.36 Despite the apparent clarity of
this rule, the Supreme Court did uphold a blatant viewpoint-based condition
on government subsidies in one landmark First Amendment case that the
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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34. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 27 n.93.
35. Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 152 (1996).
36. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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Court continues to cite approvingly.37 This Section provides a brief
overview of major conditional funding cases, shows how the Court has
reconciled them, and then shows where voucher programs should fit into
the mix.
1. Unconstitutional Conditions: An Overview of Major Cases
The classic example of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
Speiser v. Randall.38 In Speiser, the Court invalidated a California law that
conditioned veterans' property tax exemptions on a declaration by the
beneficiary disavowing a belief in overthrowing the U.S. government by
force, violence, or other unlawful means. The Court held that the condition
was essentially a penalty: "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage
in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. 39
The Court has struck down a number of laws by applying this same
principle, often by a 5-4 vote. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the
majority held unconstitutional a federal statute that prohibited
noncommercial educational stations receiving public broadcast grants from
editorializing. 40 Applying a form of heightened scrutiny, the Court
invalidated the restriction, finding that the law was aimed at a form of
speech that lay at the "heart"4' of the First Amendment, and that the law
was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest.
42
In another 5-4 decision, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Court applied the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to require a state university to provide funds to a Christian student
group for its religious magazine.4 The University of Virginia had created a
Student Activities Fund "to support a broad range of extracurricular student
activities .. related to the educational purpose of the University." 4 The
Appropriations Committee for the Fund denied a Christian student group's
request for reimbursement for printing costs on the ground that the
publication was "religious activity. 'A5 The Supreme Court found that in
establishing the Fund, the University had created a limited public forum.
The Court did not question that a state could confine such a forum of its
own creation to the "limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
37. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), cited with approval in United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003) (plurality opinion), and Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-43 (2001).
38. 357 U.S. 513.
39. Id. at 518.
40. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
41. Id. at 381.
42. Id. at 389.
43. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
44. Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 827.
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created... [and] reserv[e] it for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics. ' '46 But once the state has opened a limited forum, it "may not
exclude speech where [the exclusion] is not 'reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum,' nor may it discriminate against speech on the
basis of its viewpoint. ' '47 Exclusion of the Christian group was
impermissibly viewpoint-based.
In 2001, the Court handed down yet another 5-4 decision in this area of
jurisprudence, invalidating a federal law that prohibited lawyers receiving
funds from the federal Legal Services Corporation from participating "'in
any... way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to
reform a Federal or State welfare system.', 4 8 The Velazquez Court found
that, as in Rosenberger, the government had undertaken to fund private
speech in a limited forum, and that it could not engage in viewpoint
discrimination within that forum.
49
One highly controversial First Amendment case, Rust v. Sullivan,
stands in sharp conflict with the cases just described. 50 Rust involved a
challenge to a federal regulation that prohibited private family-planning
services receiving federal funds from providing "'counseling concerning
the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provid[ing] referral
for abortion as a method of family planning."'' 5' Recipients of government
funds could discourage abortion (indeed, they had to) but they were
prohibited from engaging in activities that "'encourage, promote or
advocate abortion."'' 52 The five-Justice majority found no First Amendment
problem with the regulations, noting that "the government may 'make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and... implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.' ' 53 In so doing, the Court
explained, "the Government has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other., 54 This last sentence was particularly striking (and arguably
nonsensical), considering that the "activity" to which the Court referred
involved speech of a specific viewpoint.
46. Id. at 829.
47. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
48. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538 (2001) (quoting Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-53).
49. Id. at 545.
50. 500 U.S. 173 (1991); cf Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding, in the face of an
equal protection challenge, a restriction on government funding of abortions).
51. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)).
52. Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)).
53. Id. at 192-93 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
54. Id. at 193.
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2. Reconciling the Government-Funding Cases
The Court belatedly reconciled Rust with other conditional funding
cases by finding that Rust formed a special category of "government
speech" cases to which a different First Amendment analysis applied. In
Rosenberger, the Court, citing Rust, explained that "[w]hen the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental
message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. ''55 That is, "when
the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of
its own it is entitled to say what it wishes," even if it is using private
speakers to transmit its message. 56 The restrictions at issue in Rosenberger
were not of this kind, wrote Justice Kennedy, because the University was
not itself "speak[ing] or subsidiz[ing] transmittal of a message it favor[ed]
but instead expend[ing] funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers. 57 Writing for the majority in Velazquez, Justice Kennedy
again stressed this distinction between government messages and private
messages in striking down the restrictions placed on lawyers receiving
funds from the government's Legal Services Corporation:
Although the LSC program differs from the program at issue in
Rosenberger in that its purpose is not to "encourage a diversity of
views," the salient point is that, like the program in Rosenberger,
the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to
promote a governmental message....
... In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable from Rust.
58
The rationale Justice Kennedy articulated in Rosenberger and
Velazquez to distinguish them from Rust was not at all apparent when Rust
was decided. Justice Kennedy acknowledged as much in Velazquez: "The
Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however,
we have explained Rust on this understanding. 59
Recasting Rust in this light allows us to make more sense out of that
decision. Contrary to what the Court said in Rust, the government did
55. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing
Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-200).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 834.
58. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 834).
59. Id. at 541.
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engage in viewpoint discrimination by choosing "to fund one activity to the
exclusion of another., 60 This viewpoint-based funding decision could be
sustained, however, because "the government [was using] 'private speakers
to transmit information pertaining to its own program."' 61 In contrast to
Rosenberger and Velazquez, the government in Rust had not created a
forum to facilitate private speech.62
3. Do Voucher Schools Engage in Government Speech?
Do voucher programs fall into this government-speech category carved
out by the Supreme Court?63 One might argue that states institute voucher
programs for the very purpose of diversifying the educational messages and
approaches available to the state's children and parents. Characterized in
this manner, a voucher program would not amount to government speech,
but would more closely resemble a forum like the Student Activity Fund in
Rosenberger. On the other hand, states could characterize voucher schools
as participants in a government program and transmitters of the
government's educational message. This characterization likens a voucher
program to the government funding in Rust.
The latter characterization is more appropriate. Like the federal law in
Rust, voucher laws provide funding to private institutions not to facilitate
private messages but rather to provide a specific service to the public-a
60. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
61. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
62. The Court in some cases has differentiated constitutional and unconstitutional conditions
by focusing on the divisibility of the funded program. For example, the Rust Court claimed that
the challenged law's burden on speech was minimal because Title X grantees could continue to
engage in abortion-related speech as long as those activities were kept "separate and distinct from
Title X activities." 500 U.S. at 196. This distinguished Title X from the law at issue in cases like
League of Women Voters, where broadcasters could not divide and separate their activities in any
way that would permit them to legally editorialize while receiving federal funds. See FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). The divisibility distinction also helps
explain Regan v. Taxation With Representation, where the federal government conditioned a tax
exemption for nonprofit organizations on a requirement that they forego lobbying activities. 461
U.S. 540 (1983). The Court in Regan upheld the condition, noting that nonprofit groups could still
engage in lobbying by dividing themselves in two and having only one of the organizations
engage in lobbying. Id. at 544.
Divisibility, however, no longer seems to be a decisive factor in determining the
constitutionality of a condition. Recent cases addressing conditions on funding do not directly
discuss the divisibility factor identified in Regan and League of Women Voters. See United States
v. American Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) (plurality opinion); Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533.
63. It should be emphasized that voucher schools are the subsidized entities whose actions the
government is regulating. Money may go directly to the parents, who then can choose the
participating school on which to spend it. But the channel the money follows is less important
than its ultimate destination, and the fact that parents receive the voucher first does not change the
fact that the schools are regulated beneficiaries of government assistance. See Grove City Coll. v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (upholding direct regulations on schools even though the money passed
first through the hands of students); id. at 565 ("The economic effect of direct and indirect
assistance often is indistinguishable.").
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service that by definition must include messages of a very particular kind.
The scope of the program and its messages are defined by statute. In Ohio,
for example, participating voucher schools are expected to adhere to
detailed curricular requirements. Unless granted a special exemption,
schools must teach a specified number of units in traditional subjects
including English, the fine arts, health, mathematics, science, American
history, and American government.64 In Wisconsin, private voucher schools
must provide a "sequentially progressive curriculum of fundamental
instruction in reading, language arts, mathematics, social studies, science
and health.,
65
The limited scope of these programs is comparable to the limited scope
of the Title X program at issue in Rust. Title X authorized grants not so that
clinics could provide a broad variety of services to indigent patients,
but rather so that clinics could specifically provide "family planning
methods and services," which the law defined as including "natural family
planning methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents.,
66
While Title X's requirements do not appear quite as detailed as some
voucher law requirements (such as Ohio's), this only demonstrates that
voucher programs are even more like "government speech" than the Rust
program itself.
67
Both voucher programs and Title X contrast sharply with government
programs that facilitate the communication of independent, private
messages, and that the Court has consequently refused to categorize as
government speech. In League of Women Voters, for example, the
government had sought to promote the expression of a "wide variety of
views on matters of public importance," and even to encourage the
"vigorous expression" of controversial ideas. 68 The same can be said of the
University Student Activities Fund in Rosenberger: The whole purpose of
the program, as stated by Justice O'Connor, was to create a "free and robust
marketplace of ideas.",69 To this end, the University permitted a tremendous
64. See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(3) (Anderson 2002); OHIo ADMIN. CODE
§ 3301-35-04 (Supp. 1985). Some states might adopt more flexible requirements. Florida, for
example, does not specify the precise contours of the required curriculum. Even in Florida,
however, voucher schools must at least follow a curriculum "adopted by an appropriate nonpublic
school accrediting body." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.38(4)(f) (West, WESTLAW through 2003
Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. A-D).
65. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.165(l)(d) (West 1999).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2000).
67. The argument here is not that private schools (or Title X clinics) are state actors. The
schools and clinics remain private actors, but the government enlists their voluntary support to
communicate its own message and provide a specific service.
68. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375, 397 (1984). The prohibition on
editorializing did not ban controversial content or viewpoints; it only precluded the stations from
presenting such viewpoints as their own, rather than those of another person. Id. at 397.
69. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 850 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
variety of messages; funded groups included the Gandhi Peace Center, the
Federalist Society, Students for Animal Rights, the Lesbian and Gay
Student Union, and the C.S. Lewis Society.70 Similarly, in Velazquez, the
government program at issue did not require the transmission of specific
messages. The government's Legal Services Corporation provided indigent
clients with legal assistance in noncriminal matters of essentially any
kind. 71 The breadth of all of these programs made it impossible for the
government to plausibly claim that the funded speech and messages were
its own. These programs are thus incomparable to Title X or voucher
programs, through which the government funds services and messages with
a specified content.
At least one scholar analyzing this issue has come to the opposite
conclusion. Mark Tushnet has argued that voucher programs more
appropriately fit the Rosenberger line: "Like the fund in Rosenberger,
voucher programs make public money available to parents who can choose
to send their children to schools whose curricula-their speech-range
widely. 72 As I have demonstrated, this argument overstates the degree to
which state voucher programs seek a diversity of viewpoints. Contrary to
what Tushnet implies, states with voucher programs do not seem interested
in promoting a wide array of educational messages and curricula, but rather
have very specific lessons that they wish to communicate. States seek the
participation of private schools in their programs not because they wish to
abandon traditional educational goals, but because many public schools
have failed to achieve those goals. Certainly, a state might tolerate a limited
variety of speakers and pedagogical approaches among those who
participate in the voucher program, but this is no different from the federal
government tolerating a diversity of doctors and medical techniques in the
Title X program at issue in Rust. The presence of diverse speakers does not
by itself convert the government's speech into private speech. In the case of
both vouchers and Title X programs, many different sorts of speakers may
participate in the program and the students or patients may be exposed to a
broad array of approaches and viewpoints, but that does not change the fact
that the government has enlisted the private speakers-whether they are
doctors or schools-to provide a specific public service and convey specific
government messages.
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle agree that voucher programs are
distinguishable from Rosenberger-like programs, and they defend this
position by appropriately focusing on purpose: "[T]he provision of public
services-even if they have an expressive component-is conceptually
70. Brief for the Petitioners at 4-5, Rosenberger (No. 94-329).
71. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
72. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 19.
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distinct from the creation of a forum for debate., 73 In a public forum, "the
state provides resources for the very purpose of association and expression,
[while] school choice programs have the narrower and more focused
purpose of delivering educational service to the young in the community. '74
Although the argument for including voucher programs within the
Rust paradigm seems compelling, it is obviously impossible to predict
what the courts might do in a concrete case. In the unpredictable, often
"result-oriented ' 75 realm of unconstitutional conditions, the "categorization
of the status of a speaker will ordinarily be a very specific, context-bound
judgment." 76 One can still conclude, nevertheless, that the most analytically
sound understanding of voucher programs places them in the category of
"government speech through private actors," an area where the state has
significantly more leeway to exclude messages that are incompatible with
its goals.
If courts accept this analysis, then antidiscrimination requirements
would sail past any First Amendment challenge. By prohibiting
discrimination, the state is not interfering with private expression, but is
rather making a Rust-like "value judgment" that favors nondiscriminatory
and inclusive messages in government-sponsored activity. The government
is saying, essentially, that discrimination against certain groups sends a
divisive message, grounded in intolerance, that is incompatible with the
civic values and worldview that it seeks to instill in youth through publicly
funded elementary and secondary education.
4. Counterarguments to the Government-Speech Argument
There remain some important counterarguments to consider. First, one
might argue that it is not appropriate to apply a government-speech analysis
to an expressive association case. Expressive association, one could say, is
not pure speech; it is more like conduct. That is, what is protected in
expressive association cases like Boy Scouts of America v. Dale is not the
right to speak or write certain words, but the right to determine membership
in an organization. This is different from Rust, where the government only
tried to control what words the doctors spoke (or wrote) to their patients.
Thus, while the government can control the spoken or written messages that
it communicates through private organizations, that does not necessarily
73. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 980-81.
74. Id. at 980-81.
75. Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Protection Act
and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
1025, 1071 (2002).
76. Post, supra note 35, at 156.
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mean the government can also tell those organizations whom to admit
or hire.
This argument collapses under its own weight. To the extent that
determinations about membership are conduct and not expression, the First
Amendment expressive association problem disappears, and the
discriminating schools are left without a constitutional basis for their
claims. In other words, if the counterargument is correct in maintaining that
determinations of membership are not expressive, then schools have no
basis for claiming that government policies relating to membership violate
their free speech rights in the first place. One must remember that the right
to expressive association is a First Amendment right; it is protected because
it is expressive.77 Claiming that laws relating to admissions policies are not
speech would actually seem to undermine the discriminatory schools'
constitutional case against antidiscrimination policies. Indeed, if control
over admissions policies is not expressive, then Dale was incorrectly
decided. For this reason, discriminatory schools may not even push this
argument. The schools should know that if it is expressive when they decide
who is admitted, then it is also expressive when the government decides.78
Another counterargument to the government-speech analysis would
rely on Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the 2002 case in which the Supreme
Court held that allowing parents to use school vouchers at religious schools
did not violate the Establishment Clause.79 In Zelman, it was of vital
importance to the majority's constitutional argument that the parents were
acting as constitutional circuit breakers between the state and the private
religious schools. 80 That is, Ohio's voucher program did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it was parents and students, not the state,
who made the decision whether to give money to religious schools. This
would seem to suggest that the government is not "speaking" in voucher
77. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The Supreme Court has also recognized a nonexpressive right of
"intimate association" that is protected not by the Free Speech Clause, but as a liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the right to intimate association would not
be implicated in a voucher antidiscrimination case; it extends only to associations that are "highly
personal." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. The personal relationships best exemplifying this right to
intimate association, the Court has explained, are "those that attend the creation and sustenance of
a family-marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one's
relatives." Id. at 619 (citations omitted). For an explanation of the difference between "intimate
association" and "expressive association," see id. at 617-18.
78. It is of no significance that the cases relating to government speech--or to public
fora-have not involved expressive association claims. The right of expressive association is,
after all, a newly invigorated right. Before Dale, it was asserted in few Supreme Court cases, and
it prevailed in almost none. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989); N.Y. State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. But see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
79. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
80. See id. at 653.
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programs at all; for if the government were making the decision to fund
religion, it would violate the Establishment Clause (and Zelman would have
come out the other way).8 '
This counterargument, however, fails to account for the differences
between speakers and speech; it falsely assumes that because a private
actor's speech may be governmental in one aspect, it must also be so in all
others. To the contrary, the government's decision to direct specific speech
through a private actor-in this case, voucher schools--does not convert all
speech of that actor into government speech. The state may use voucher
schools to convey certain educational messages (and the state may forbid
acts that contradict that message), but the state does not thereby compel all
aspects of voucher education. Antidiscrimination regimes in voucher
schools may thus remain government speech, even as the government
remains indifferent to the religious or nonreligious nature of those schools
in order to avoid Establishment Clause problems.
C. Regulation of Voucher Programs as Limited Public or Nonpublic Fora
Even if courts find that voucher programs do not fit into
the government-speech model, they should still not invalidate
antidiscrimination requirements that states attach as conditions for
participation. Under the tests formulated by the Supreme Court in
government-funding cases, these antidiscrimination policies should survive
First Amendment scrutiny.
When the government provides property or funding for private
expressive activity, restrictions on that expressive activity are subject to
varying degrees of scrutiny, depending on the nature of the "forum" that the
government has created. Restrictions are most constitutionally suspect in
traditional and designated public fora. "Traditional" public fora are those
public spaces-such as parks and streets-that "'by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate."',, 2 The
government can exclude speakers from these fora "'only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion
is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.' ' 8 3 "Designated" public fora are
those that the government opens "'for expressive activity by part or all of
the public.' '8 4 The exclusion of a speaker "who falls within the class to
81. Daboll, supra note 2, at 727-28.
82. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
83. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (quoting Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800).
84. Id. (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992)).
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which a designated public forum is made generally available" will be
subject to strict scrutiny. 5
It is obvious, largely for the reasons discussed in the previous Section,
that voucher programs do not fall into either of these categories. Voucher
programs are not created for any sort of speaker, nor are they even created
for any sort of school.86
Voucher programs could, on the other hand, be reasonably labeled
"limited public fora" or "nonpublic fora." A limited public forum is, as its
name implies, a forum opened by the government to a limited class of
people for limited expressive purposes. s7 The Student Activity Fund in
Rosenberger was such a forum. A nonpublic forum is government property
(or funding) provided for certain individuals or organizations, but not for
purpose of creating a vehicle for public communication. 8 Airports, military
bases, and government charity programs have been deemed nonpublic fora.
It is not necessary to determine whether voucher programs are limited
public fora or nonpublic fora,89 because the First Amendment analysis is
essentially the same in either case: Restrictions must not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint, and they must be reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.90 Antidiscrimination requirements could easily satisfy
this test.
1. Antidiscrimination Policies Are Viewpoint-Neutral
It has been well-established by the Supreme Court that
antidiscrimination policies are not viewpoint-discriminatory. This may be
surprising, since antidiscrimination law serves such obvious expressive
functions-as the government-speech argument emphasized-and so
clearly disfavors those who disagree with antidiscrimination norms. As I
demonstrate below, however, this apparent inconsistency can be explained.
85. Id.
86. In the unlikely event that voucher programs are deemed designated public fora,
antidiscrimination requirements should, for the reasons explained in Section II.D, nonetheless
survive the scrutiny to which the courts would subject them.
87. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001).
88. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
89. Some courts have found that there is no difference between the two. See DiLoreto v.
Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999); Summium v.
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 1997). In general, there is quite a bit of confusion
surrounding the categorization of fora. See Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834,
842 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000).
90. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682; Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Two of the most conservative Supreme
Court Justices, Scalia and Thomas, would go even further and find that viewpoint discrimination
in the allocation of government funds never violates the First Amendment, provided that the
government has not created an open public forum. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 598-99 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the current Court has
unanimously found that antidiscrimination laws "do not, as a general
matter, violate the First... Amendment[]." 91 This finding is plainly
incompatible with the claim that such laws are viewpoint-discriminatory,
given that viewpoint-discriminatory laws, as a general matter, do violate the
First Amendment.
92
More importantly, when confronting the viewpoint discrimination
question head-on, the Court has expressly stated that antidiscrimination
laws are not viewpoint-discriminatory. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
for example, the Court found that Minnesota's law banning discrimination
in public accommodations did "not distinguish between prohibited and
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint." 93 The law instead "reflect[ed]
the State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and
assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services,"
a goal that was "unrelated to the suppression of expression., 94 Other cases
have come to similar conclusions. 95 Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale did hold
that New Jersey's application of its antidiscrimination law violated the First
Amendment, but the Court did not base this decision on a finding of
viewpoint discrimination.96
While the Supreme Court has made clear that antidiscrimination laws
do not constitute viewpoint discrimination, it has not clearly articulated
91. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
92. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).
93. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
94. Id. at 624.
95. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (stating that a
law prohibiting gender discrimination served compelling interests and did not discriminate based
on viewpoint); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (citing Title VII as a
"content-neutral" prohibition of discriminatory conduct).
96. The opinion contained no discussion of viewpoint discrimination. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, however, writing for the majority, did make one statement that seemed indirectly to
accuse New Jersey of engaging in viewpoint discrimination. At the very end of the opinion, he
wrote that "[states are] not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
661 (2000). This statement makes little sense in light of the rest of the opinion and the facts of the
case. Nowhere in the opinion did the majority suggest that the purpose of the law was to suppress
disfavored ideas, much less that this was the only purpose. Nor had the majority voiced any
disagreement when it cited the New Jersey court's finding that the law's purpose was to protect
against '"the destructive consequences of discrimination,"' id. at 647 (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1227-28 (N.J. 1999)), a purpose that the Court had previously recognized
as viewpoint-neutral, see, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-24. Moreover, if the concluding sentence
accurately reflected a belief by the majority that New Jersey's policy amounted to viewpoint
discrimination, it is exceedingly odd that the Chief Justice did not mention this anywhere else in
his opinion; after all, a finding of viewpoint discrimination would have significantly bolstered the
majority's holding. Taken as a whole then, Dale does not support the position that
antidiscrimination laws are viewpoint-discriminatory. Indeed, the only appeals court since Dale to
consider the viewpoint-discrimination question in the context of a gay rights law concluded that
the law was viewpoint-neutral. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 92-95 (2d Cir.
2003).
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the reasoning behind this conclusion. As noted, it seems obvious that
antidiscrimination policies disadvantage those who disagree with
antidiscrimination norms. For example, a law prohibiting racial
discrimination in the workplace disfavors employers who wish to profess
to their employees that interactions among different races are immoral
and unhealthy. Moreover, many legislators may have voted for the
antidiscrimination law for the purpose of disfavoring the racist viewpoints
held by such employers. But despite the viewpoint-discriminatory purposes
and effects of the law, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would call
the law viewpoint-discriminatory. To do so would uproot antidiscrimination
law entirely.
How can we explain this? A first response is that antidiscrimination law
does not directly refer to the expression of any viewpoint, but is instead, on
its face, a regulation of conduct. The Supreme Court has often emphasized
the importance of this distinction.97 More importantly, regardless of
the content-specific or viewpoint-specific motivations underlying
antidiscrimination laws, -they can also be independently justified without
reference to viewpoint or content. 98 Specifically, they are justified by
the state's content- and viewpoint-neutral interest in preventing the
"economic and social harms of discrimination." 99 If a law burdening
expressive conduct "can be justified without reference to the content of
the expression,"' 00  it is content-neutral-and therefore viewpoint-
neutrall°0-for the purposes of constitutional analysis, regardless of other
content-specific or viewpoint-specific purposes motivating its enactment.
Though this explanation has not been precisely articulated by the Court, it
is supported by precedent.
0 2
Under this approach, antidiscrimination requirements for voucher
schools would be deemed viewpoint-neutral despite the fact that one
of their underlying purposes is to disfavor specific discriminatory
messages in education. Because these laws also serve the independent,
97. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
98. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citing City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
99. Wyman, 335 F.3d at 94.
100. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (emphasis added).
101. Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination. Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("Viewpoint discrimination is ... an
egregious form of content discrimination."). If a law is content-neutral, it is also, by definition,
viewpoint-neutral. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true. Viewpoint-neutral laws are not
always content-neutral.
102. See, e.g., Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. at 294; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989) ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.");
Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 47 (finding that a law serving a legitimate interest was not invalid
merely because one "motivating factor" may have been a desire to restrict First Amendment
rights).
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viewpoint-neutral interest in ensuring that all of the state's children have
equal educational opportunity, courts should not find them to be
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
One might object to this analytical approach on the ground that states
could disingenuously assert viewpoint-neutral justifications for laws in
order to immunize their speech-suppressing policies from constitutional
attack. This objection overlooks two key aspects of First Amendment
analysis. First, courts do not and would not blindly accept any post hoc
justification offered for a law suppressing expressive activity. Second and
more importantly, the fact that a law is deemed "viewpoint-neutral"
does not immunize it from attack under the First Amendment. Even
viewpoint-neutral laws may be unconstitutional if they are unreasonable or
if they significantly burden expression. This is precisely what occurred in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Thus, if a state were to come up with a
plausible viewpoint-neutral purpose for its law, a court would still be free to
inquire into whether that purpose justified the burdens on speech imposed
by the statute. The burdens in a government-funding case, however, would
certainly be small.
10 3
2. Antidiscrimination Policies Are Reasonable
Under the test for limited and nonpublic fora, viewpoint-neutral
restrictions are permissible if they are "reasonable in light of the purpose"
served by the forum. 04
Voucher antidiscrimination policies would most certainly pass this test.
The very purpose of voucher programs is to expand and improve
educational opportunity for a state's or city's students. A policy requiring
that the program be open to all students regardless of race, gender, religion,
or other factors is not only "reasonable," but also directly advances the
program's purpose by ensuring educational opportunity for all students.
Notably, the only federal appeals court to hear a post-Dale challenge to
the exclusion of a discriminatory organization from a government forum
upheld the exclusion. In Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Connecticut's refusal to allow the Boy
Scouts of America to benefit from a state-established charity program. The
exclusion of the Boy Scouts stemmed from its discriminatory ban on gay
members; Connecticut law did not permit state agencies to support
organizations that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Judge
Calabresi, writing for a unanimous panel, found that Connecticut's
103. See infra Subsection II.D.3.
104. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998); Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 829.
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exclusion of the Boy Scouts from this nonpublic forum was both viewpoint-
neutral and reasonable, and therefore constitutional.1
0 5
D. Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Voucher Antidiscrimination Policies
Voucher antidiscrimination policies should not be subject to heightened
scrutiny, for they are not "direct[] and immediate[]"'' 0 6 regulations of
expressive conduct (that is, they only apply to those choosing to participate
in the program) and they are not viewpoint-discriminatory. Nevertheless, it
is conceivable, depending perhaps on the court and the facts of the
particular case, that a judge would subject antidiscrimination requirements
to some form of heightened scrutiny. A court might believe, for example,
that the denial of the subsidy in a given case amounts to a penalty or tax. 10 7
There is more than one type of heightened scrutiny that could be
applied. One possibility would be the O'Brien test. In United States v.
O'Brien, the Court held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct," government regulation of that
conduct is permissible only if it furthers an "important or substantial
government interest" that is "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression" and if the restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are "no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."'08 Because
the practice of discrimination has both expressive and nonexpressive
qualities to it, courts may find the O'Brien test appropriate in an
antidiscrimination case.'0 9
An even stricter form of heightened scrutiny would use the test
articulated in Dale. Under this standard, regulations of expressive conduct
must serve "'compelling' state interests that are unrelated to the
suppression of ideas-interests that "'cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."' 10 Voucher
105. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Evans v. City of
Berkeley, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 702 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the City of Berkeley's denial of
funds to organizations discriminating against gays and atheists did not violate the First
Amendment), review granted, 65 P.3d 402 (Cal. 2003).
106. Wyman, 335 F.3d at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
518 (1958). Consider also FCC v. League of Women Voters, where the Court applied heightened
scrutiny to a viewpoint-neutral restriction despite the fact that the restriction could be avoided by
simply turning down government funds. 468 U.S. 364, 384, 399-400 (1984).
108. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
109. O'Brien does not apply when the burden imposed "directly and immediately affects
associational rights... that enjoy First Amendment protection." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 659 (2000). But a restriction that can be avoided by simply refusing government
funding is not direct and immediate. See Wyman, 335 F.3d at 91 (finding that conditional funding,
unlike the law in Dale, did not impose a "'direct[] and immediate[].' burden, "since its
conditioned exclusion [did] not rise to the level of compulsion" (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at
658-59)).
110. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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antidiscrimination requirements can and should survive either of these
difficult tests.
1. The Compelling Interest in Eradicating Discrimination in
Education
States have a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in
education, an interest that outweighs the minimal burdens on speech
imposed by voucher programs' antidiscrimination policies. The compelling
nature of the interest is supported by the unique importance of education in
our society and the destructive effects of discrimination on the "entire
educational process."''
I
At first view perhaps, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale might appear
inconsistent with the argument that free speech and expressive association
may be burdened when a state claims to have a compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination. In Dale, the free speech right of expressive
association exempted the Boy Scouts from New Jersey's public
accommodations law banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The Dale Court, however, did not reject the possibility that sufficiently
compelling state interests could override free speech associational rights in
some contexts. On the contrary, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding
principle that the right of expressive association "is not absolute" and can
be overridden by regulations that are narrowly tailored "to serve compelling
state interests."
1 12
Unfortunately, the Dale Court failed to articulate what sort of
compelling interest would suffice. Indeed, the Dale Court conspicuously
evaded that question. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
noted that in previous expressive association cases like Roberts v. United
States Jaycees 13 and Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club,1 14 the Court had found a compelling state interest in eradicating
discrimination against women. But Chief Justice Rehnquist avoided a
comparison between the compelling interest found in those cases and the
compelling interest asserted by Dale. Instead, he distinguished those cases
by saying that the enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws in Roberts
and Rotary Club did "not materially interfere with the ideas that the
organization sought to express."' 1 5 Under this interpretation, Roberts and
Rotary Club came out the way they did not because of the states'
compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination, but because the
111. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973).
112. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. 468 U.S. 609.
114. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
115. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657.
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burden on First Amendment rights in those cases was insignificant. But if
the burden was insignificant, one wonders why the presence or absence of a
compelling interest in those cases was relevant in the first place. The
compelling interest inquiry, after all, only becomes necessary when there is
a demonstrated burden on expression.' 16 The Dale majority's logic suggests
that the Roberts and Rotary Club Courts reached the compelling interest
question unnecessarily.. 1
7
Having distinguished Roberts and Rotary Club in a way that made their
compelling interest inquiries superfluous, the Dale majority left unclear
what sort of compelling interest would suffice when there was a
demonstrated burden on expression. Of course, the unmistakable holding of
Dale is that the state interest in eradicating antigay discrimination in private
membership groups1 8 was not sufficiently compelling to override the Boy
Scouts' associational rights. But the state interest in eradicating
discrimination in education is very different, and the courts should find it
compelling enough to override a voucher school's right to discriminate.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that education plays a uniquely
important role in society and that discrimination in education is especially
pernicious. The most famous case standing for these principles is, of
course, Brown v. Board of Education, in which the Court called education
116. See Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 364-67 (1988) (holding that because the
challenged statute did not "directly and substantially interfere" with First Amendment
associational rights, heightened scrutiny did not apply (internal quotation marks omitted)).
117. With regard to Rotary Club, Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation is most likely
correct. The Rotary Club Court did not purport to rest its decision on a compelling interest
justification; it merely stated that "[e]ven if' the law in question worked "some slight
infringement" on the Rotary members' First Amendment rights, the infringement was justified by
the state's interest in eliminating sex discrimination. 481 U.S. at 549. The Dale majority's reading'
of Roberts, on the other hand, is more surprising, and probably incorrect, since in that case the
Court developed the compelling interest argument more fully and seemed to rely more heavily on
it. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-26 (describing the state's compelling interest and explaining that
"[b]y prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act
protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms").
118. It is apparent that the Court considered the Scouts a distinctly private group and that the
Justices were very troubled by the New Jersey law's characterization of the organization as a
"public accommodation." See Dale, 530 U.S. at 657. It is thus unsurprising that the Court did not
believe that a consideration of the state interest in eradicating discrimination in public
accommodations was important for deciding the case. See id. at 644 ("The Boy Scouts is a private,
not-for-profit organization ...."); id. at 652 (quoting a position statement issued by the Scouts in
which the organization described itself as a "private, membership organization"); id. at 656-57
(calling New Jersey's public accommodations law "extremely broad"); id. at 657 (stating that the
New Jersey Supreme Court had, in applying the law to the Boy Scouts, "applied its public
accommodations law to a private entity"); id. at 657 n.3 (observing that "[flour State Supreme
Courts and one United States Court of Appeals ha[d] ruled that the Boy Scouts is not a place of
public accommodation" and that "[n]o federal appellate court or state supreme court-except the
New Jersey Supreme Court in this case-ha[d] reached a contrary result"). It is also telling that
Justice O'Connor referred to the Boy Scouts as a "purely private organization" at oral arguments
in order to distinguish the Scouts from other groups that had been held to antidiscrimination laws.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Dale (No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 44, at *29.
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"the very foundation of good citizenship."' 1 9 The unanimous Court
observed: "Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities . ,,120 The Court reaffirmed
these principles three decades later in Plyler v. Doe, even as it
acknowledged that education was not actually a "fundamental right"
guaranteed to children by the Constitution. 12 The Court stressed that while
education may not be constitutionally mandated, "neither is it merely
some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation .... The American people have always regarded
education... [as a] matter[] of supreme importance .... [E]ducation has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society., 122 The Court
cautioned that it could not ignore "the significant social costs borne by our
Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and
skills upon which our social order rests."
'1 23
Of course, both Brown and Plyler dealt with public education. They
were equal protection cases dealing with discrimination by the state against
an entire class of children, so their precise holdings are obviously not
directly applicable to the voucher question. Nonetheless, the Court's
recognition of education's vital social role is certainly transferable to other
areas of law, as is the Court's emphasis on the principle of equal
educational opportunity.
In referring to both public and private schools, the Court has repeated
on several occasions that "discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive
influence on the entire educational process."' 124 The Court has also stated
that "'legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from
discriminatory practices.' '1 25 Given these unequivocal statements, it is not
surprising that the Court has upheld the government's authority to refuse
support for discrimination in private education, or even to ban it altogether.
As discussed above, Runyon v. McCrary upheld the application of a federal
119. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
120. Id.
121. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 37 (1973)).
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) ("[E]ducation [is] pivotal
to sustaining our political and cultural heritage [and has] a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of society.... [E]ducation ... is the very foundation of good citizenship." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
124. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,469 (1973); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
772 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 594 (1983) (same); Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 571 (1974)
(same).
125. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593-94 (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 469) (emphasis
omitted).
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antidiscrimination law to a private school that only accepted white
students. 26 The Court stated emphatically that "'the Constitution... places
no value on discrimination,"' and that "while '[i]nvidious private
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment... it has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.'" 27  In Bob Jones
University v. United States, the Court upheld the government's refusal of
tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University because of the school's racially
discriminatory policies. 128 The Court held that the government had a
"fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education," including private education. 129 This interest prevailed over the
university's First Amendment claim of free exercise of religion. 3 0
These cases are not ambiguous. They indicate that, at a minimum, laws
prohibiting racial discrimination in education serve an interest that is
sufficiently compelling to override a voucher school's First Amendment
right not to associate with a disfavored group. Indeed, if Runyon is still
good law, racial discrimination in all private schools is already prohibited
by federal law, whether those schools receive vouchers or not. More
difficult questions arise, of course, when one confronts discrimination that
is not based on race. While there may be an "unbroken line of cases"
establishing "beyond doubt" that "racial discrimination in education
violates a most fundamental national public policy,' 13 1 the same cannot
obviously be said about antigay discrimination, discrimination against the
disabled, or even sex discrimination. 
132
Nevertheless, the fact that the Court has not treated all forms of
discrimination identically should not limit a state's authority to assert a
compelling interest in eradicating all invidious discrimination in education.
The important point is that the Court has recognized that education plays a
unique and essential role in our society and that discrimination is
incompatible with this role. While most of the relevant education cases
have dealt with race, the Court has appropriately expressed its disapproval
of discrimination in more general terms. 
33
126. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
127. Id. at 176 (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470 (alteration in original)).
128. 461 U.S. 574.
129. Id. at 604.
130. The law of free exercise has undergone major change since the Court decided Bob Jones
University, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), but the Supreme Court has never
rejected its language regarding discrimination in education.
131. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
132. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 534 n.7 (1996) (stating that "inherent
differences" between the sexes may justify differential treatment and explaining that the Court
"[did] not question [Virginia's] prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational
opportunities," including single-sex schools).
133. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593; Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469
(1973) ("[L]egitimate educational function cannot be isolated from discriminatory
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Allowing a state to enforce its compelling interest in eradicating
nonracial forms of discrimination in education would not require the Court
to heighten the level of review it grants to those forms of discrimination in
its state action and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. It would only
require that the Court reaffirm both the singular importance of education in
our national life and the states' well-established power to prohibit
discrimination in many forms and in many sectors of society. This state
power undoubtedly includes fighting non-race-based forms of
discrimination that receive low levels of scrutiny from the Court in its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 1
34
2. Narrow Tailoring
It is also clear that antidiscrimination requirements are narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling interests at stake. These laws do no more
than ban the very practice that the state has a compelling interest in
prohibiting.
The Supreme Court apparently agrees, because it has not overturned
antidiscrimination laws for lack of narrow tailoring. Dale should not be
understood as an exception to this practice. In Dale, the state did not have a
compelling interest in eradicating the discrimination by private membership
groups like the Boy Scouts. Under strict scrutiny, no amount of narrow
tailoring can save the law if it does not serve a compelling purpose.
In antidiscrimination cases where the Court has recognized a
compelling interest in eradicating a certain kind of discrimination-such as
the interest in eliminating discrimination in commercial organizations-the
antidiscrimination law has easily survived the "narrow tailoring" inquiry.
For example, in upholding the sex discrimination law in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Court found that the law 'respond[ed] precisely to the
substantive problem which legitimately concern[ed]' the State and
abridge[d] no more speech or associational freedom than... necessary.' 35
3. The Escape Option and the Burden on Speech
The Supreme Court has not articulated how exactly the weight of a
burden on speech fits into its compelling interest test in First Amendment
cases. Nevertheless, it is evident from the Court's jurisprudence that the
practices .... [D]iscriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational
process." (citation omitted)).
134. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1996); see also infra notes 157-161 and
accompanying text (discussing statutory prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination and the
Court's approval of these prohibitions).
135. 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
810 (1984)).
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weight of the burden on speech is a significant factor in its analysis. With
this in mind, it is clear that school voucher programs can be distinguished
from Dale even further.
In a voucher program that prohibits discrimination, the burden on
schools' freedom is indisputably small. Schools may simply refuse to
accept voucher students and thereby relieve themselves of the government
restrictions. Such an easy escape from government regulation was not
available in Dale; nor is it necessarily available in all cases where
government benefits are given conditioned on adherence to state
regulations.
For example, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court
emphasized that the restrictions on attorneys as a condition for government
funds placed a "serious and fundamental restriction" on speech that
"distort[ed] the legal system."'' 36 The burden was especially pernicious
because indigent clients could not just withdraw from the government-
funded legal program to free themselves of the restrictions; financial
necessity made the publicly funded lawyers their only source of information
and legal support.137 Because the restrictions on both the legal system and
the clients were enormous, and because withdrawing from the program was
not a viable option, the Court found the law unconstitutional.
The degree of burden on speech has also factored into the Court's
analysis in antidiscrimination cases. In holding New Jersey's public
accommodations law unconstitutional as applied, the Dale Court repeatedly
stressed the burdensome effects of the law on the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment rights, stating that the "forced inclusion of Dale would
significantly affect [the Boy Scouts'] expression' ' 38 and that this burden
was "direct[] and immediate[]. ' 139
In contrast, where antidiscrimination laws have imposed only small
burdens on speech, the Court has upheld the laws' application. For
example, in upholding antidiscrimination laws over First Amendment
claims in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club and
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court referred not only to the state's
compelling interest in eradicating sex discrimination, but also emphasized
that the burdens on the defendants' free speech rights were minimal. 40 The
Court made comparable arguments in Hishon v. King & Spalding and Bob
Jones University v. United States, finding that even if there was a burden on
136. 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
137. Id. at 546.
138. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
139. Id. at 659.
140. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987); Roberts, 468
U.S. at 626.
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the discriminating entity's speech, it was not excessive in light of the
compelling interest. 141
In Grove City College v. Bell-a case that in many ways might
resemble a voucher discrimination case-the Supreme Court again upheld
an antidiscrimination policy by citing the minimal burden on speech. 142 The
federal government in that case had demanded that a private college adhere
to Title IX's antidiscrimination requirements as a condition of federal
financial assistance. As would be the case in many voucher programs, the
government assistance was not in the form of direct aid to the school, but
rather consisted of "Basic Educational Opportunity Grants" (BEOGs) to
students. The college challenged the antidiscrimination requirements on
First Amendment grounds, but the majority paid scant attention to this
claim:
Grove City's [argument]-that conditioning federal assistance
on compliance with Title IX infringes First Amendment rights
of the College and its students-warrants only brief
consideration.... Grove City may terminate its participation in the
BEOG program and thus avoid the requirements of § 901(a).
Students affected by the Department's action may either take their
BEOG's elsewhere or attend Grove City without federal financial
assistance. Requiring Grove City to comply with Title IX's
prohibition of discrimination as a condition for its continued
eligibility to participate in the BEOG program infringes no First
Amendment rights of the College or its students. 
143
Given that participation by schools in state voucher programs is entirely
voluntarily, it should be difficult for schools to argue convincingly that
antidiscrimination requirements unduly burden their First Amendment
freedoms. Just as in Grove City College, a voucher school that objects to an
141. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
142. 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984).
143. Id. (citation omitted); see also Evans v. City of Berkeley, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 702 (Ct.
App. 2002), review granted, 65 P.3d 402 (Cal. 2003). In Evans, the California Court of Appeal
upheld the City of Berkeley's denial of a public subsidy to the Boy Scouts. Rejecting the Scouts'
First Amendment claim, the court emphasized that the city's action did not interfere in any
significant way with the organization's speech:
Berkeley has not attempted to muzzle anyone's speech, and Berkeley has not ordered
appellants to cease discriminating or associating as they please. Berkeley has only
prevented appellants from enjoying a certain city subsidy, free rent, unless appellants'
program is open to all residents without regard to the barriers created by the types of
invidious discrimination Berkeley seeks to discourage.
Evans, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702-03.
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antidiscrimination requirement-or any other conditions on vouchers-can
"terminate its participation... and thus avoid the requirements."'
' 44
On the other hand, if there is evidence that a school will suffer
substantial financial costs if it stops accepting voucher students-something
that is unlikely for the time being 145-a court might find that there is a
significant burden on speech. The Grove City College Court did not
consider this possibility. Nevertheless, even where a school feels financially
pressured to admit voucher students, it still has the final choice over
whether to do so, and in this respect the government regulation is
fundamentally different from laws like the one in Dale, which provided
organizations with no choice as to whether or not to comply.
4. "The Gay Exception ": Distinguishing Different Forms of
Discrimination
In speculating about how courts might react to voucher
antidiscrimination requirements, it would be naive not to consider the
political pressures and personal ideologies that may lead judges to
distinguish between various kinds of discrimination. One obvious problem
is that some judges may find antigay discrimination perfectly acceptable, or
at least less objectionable than other discriminatory practices. Evidence of
this attitude is found in the fact that state and federal laws routinely draw
distinctions that favor heterosexuals, and courts have been reluctant to
question the validity of these distinctions save in the most extreme
circumstances. 146 Indeed, fervently antigay attitudes continue to be
espoused by some Justices on the Supreme Court. In one dissenting opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia
discussed the "eminent reasonableness" of basing a state law on bare
animus toward homosexuality, and likened animus toward homosexual
144. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 575-76; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76
(1977) ("There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and
state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power
to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader." (footnote
omitted)).
145. Vouchers are typically available only to low-income parents who previously would have
been unable to afford private education. Therefore, if schools choose not to take part in a voucher
program because of opposition to antidiscrimination laws, they will probably not suffer a loss of
students; the students who are already enrolled do not rely on vouchers anyway.
146. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding a federal law
banning openly gay individuals from military service); Lofton v. Keamey, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (upholding Florida's ban on adoption by gay individuals). Note that the recently
decided case of Lawrence v. Texas may alter how courts deal with similar cases in the future. See
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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conduct to animus toward murder. 47 Frustrated advocates for gay and
lesbian rights sometimes refer to the "gay exception," by which they mean
the tendency of courts to twist otherwise unambiguous legal principles in
order to exclude gays and lesbians. 48 Justice Stevens suggested in his Dale
dissent-without using those exact words-that such a "gay exception"
might be at play: "The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding,
then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society
that their presence alone-unlike any other individual's-should be singled
out for special First Amendment treatment."'
' 49
Whether or not there was a special "gay exception" at play in the
Dale decision, it is reasonable to assume that some courts will treat
voucher antidiscrimination requirements differently depending on who is
targeted for discrimination. These distinctions-at least as they relate to
animus-based discrimination-are unfortunate and theoretically unfounded.
While nobody denies that African Americans have endured especially
horrific forms of discrimination throughout history, other groups have also
experienced and continue to experience the injustice of discriminatory laws
and social practices.150 If a state legislature reasonably believes that
irrational or animus-based discrimination is disadvantaging certain classes
of people in the all-important area of education, courts ought to respect the
state's authority to assert a compelling interest in eradicating that
discrimination-an interest that overrides any voucher school's "right" to
government benefits.
Distinctions that treat antigay discrimination as a more acceptable form
of discrimination are not only on weak theoretical footing, but they are also
increasingly on weak legal footing as well. A solid majority of the Supreme
147. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See, e.g., JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 13-14, 194,215-16,436,511-12,524 (2001).
149. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 696 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Those who espouse antigay views would obviously argue that discrimination against
homosexuals is analytically distinct from other forms of discrimination. One common argument is
that homosexuality pertains to behavior, while race and sex do not. But sexual orientation is not
defined by behavior. See Am. Psychological Ass'n, Answers to Your Questions About Sexual
Orientation and Homosexuality, at http://www.apa.org/pubinfo/answers.html (last visited Nov.
11, 2003) ("Sexual orientation is different from sexual behavior because it refers to feelings and
self-concept."). Furthermore, race and gender bias often manifests itself as opposition to behavior:
An individual might say, for example, that he does not condemn black people or women, but only
interracial marriage and women working outside of the home. Another common argument is that
genuinely held religious beliefs justify antigay discrimination. But as is commonly known,
religion has been used to justify discrimination in all forms. See, e.g., PETER GOMES, THE GOOD
BOOK 92-93 (1996) ("Those who wished to challenge the morality of slavery found that they had
to challenge both the authority and the interpretation of scripture .... [T]he biblical case for
slavery was both strong and consistent."). In any event, it is beyond the scope of this Note to
defend the civil rights of gays and lesbians in general. The relevant point here is that states should
have the discretion to prohibit discrimination they reasonably find to be invidious and harmful,
and courts ought to continue their tradition of respecting these legislative judgments.
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Court has now rejected antigay animus as a legitimate basis for a law. In the
landmark 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,'15 1 the Court overturned its
notoriously antigay precedent Bowers v. Hardwick,1 52 a decision that had
upheld sodomy laws and had been widely used to justify discrimination
against gays and lesbians.1 53 Invalidating Texas's antigay sodomy law
under the Due Process Clause, the Court in Lawrence seemed almost to
apologize for its ruling in Bowers, stating that the decision had "demean[ed]
the lives of homosexual persons"'154 and that gays and lesbians were
"entitled to respect for their private lives."'1 55 Concurring in the judgment,
Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[m]oral disapproval of this group [gays
and lesbians], like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause."1
56
This is not to say that courts would have to raise the level of scrutiny
that they apply to sexual orientation classifications in order to sustain a
voucher antidiscrimination law.' 57 Nor would courts somehow have to
require states to protect gays and lesbians from private discrimination.
Courts must only recognize that state legislatures may reasonably conclude
that sexual orientation discrimination is invidious and that the legislatures
may therefore proscribe such discrimination in areas such as employment,
public accommodations, and education. This would hardly be a radical step.
Fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and more than 140 localities have
already banned sexual orientation discrimination in the private sector, 158
and even before Lawrence the Supreme Court made clear that states could
enforce such laws without running afoul of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. As Justice Souter explained for a unanimous Court in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, provisions
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation and other factors "are
well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to
151. 123 S. Ct. 2472.
152. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
153. See Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect: Sodomy Statutes as Weapons, NEW REPUBLIC, June
23, 2003, at 12.
154. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
155. Id. at 2484.
156. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. I believe, however, that they should. For a brief but excellent discussion of why sexual
orientation should be a suspect classification in equal protection law, see Watkins v. U.S. Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1345-49 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
158. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FUND, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR
GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 2002, at 9-11 (2003),
http://www.hrc.org/worknet/publications/state-workplace/2002/sow2002.pdf. The report lists
only thirteen states as banning discrimination because it was published before a fourteenth state,
New Mexico, approved its antidiscrimination law. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie
Supp. 2003).
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believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as
a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments."
'1 59
Indeed, not only has the Court spoken approvingly of these
antidiscrimination laws, but on one occasion it invalidated a voter attempt
to ban them by state constitutional amendment. In Romer v. Evans, the
Court struck down Amendment 2, a Colorado state constitutional
amendment banning gay rights laws throughout the state. 60 While the
Romer Court did not condemn antigay discrimination using the same
powerful language that it has used in racial discrimination cases, it did
clearly acknowledge that some forms of antigay discrimination are
irrationally based in animus, that states may not engage in such animus-
based antigay discrimination, and that state and local governments must be
permitted to ban such discrimination in the private sector. 
161
E. A Deferential Approach: Viewpoint Discrimination Is Inevitable
I have thus far argued that voucher antidiscrimination policies do not
violate the Free Speech Clause because they amount to government speech;
that even if they do not amount to government speech, they are reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral restrictions on a limited public or nonpublic forum; and
that even if these arguments are rejected and the antidiscrimination
requirements are subject to heightened scrutiny, they should pass that test.
Even if a court were to reject all these arguments and identify
antidiscrimination laws in the school context as viewpoint-discriminatory,
the court could still avoid a finding of unconstitutionality by adopting the
deferential approach of United States v. American Library Ass'n,t
1 62
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,163 and Arkansas Education
Television Commission v. Forbes.'64 In these cases, the Supreme Court
declined to scrutinize closely content- and viewpoint-based government
159. 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). Hurley itself, however, invalidated Massachusetts's attempt
to use such a law to force a private organization to allow a gay and lesbian group to carry a banner
in its parade. Significantly, the organization did not seek to exclude gays and lesbians from the
parade altogether; it merely sought to disallow them from carrying banners with certain messages.
Id. at 572-73.
160. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
161. See id. at 632 (stating that "the amendment seem[ed] inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affectfed]; it lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests"); see also id. at 629 ("Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing protection
against the injuries that... public-accommodations laws address. That in itself is a severe
consequence .. "); id. at 631 ("[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon
[homosexuals]."); id. at 635 ("Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals ... to make them unequal to
everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to
its laws.").
162. 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) (plurality opinion).
163. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
164. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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regulation in the subsidy context under the theory that such scrutiny would
be "incompatible with the role" of the funded entity. 165 In the case of
private access to public television, for example, the Forbes Court was
deferential to government regulations restricting speakers and speech
because "broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical,
as a general rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must
,,166exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations. ' 1
Similarly, in the allocation of public funds to private artists, the Finley
Court held that "[a]ny content-based considerations that may be taken into
account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts
funding": Funds would necessarily be distributed "according to the artistic
worth of competing applicants," making "absolute neutrality... simply
inconceivable."'' 67 A plurality of the Court said the same of federally funded
libraries in United States v. American Library Ass'. Close judicial
scrutiny, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for four Justices, is "incompatible
with the discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional
missions," since "[p]ublic library staffs necessarily consider content in
making collection decisions."
1 68
Applying a similar rationale, courts might conclude that close judicial
scrutiny is unsuited to a state's regulation of speech in the education
context, because such scrutiny "'would be antithetical ... to the discretion
that [states] must exercise' ' 169 to ensure that adequate education is available
to the state's youth. If the state is to provide all students with an adequate
education, "'absolute neutrality is simply inconceivable.""' 70  This
deferential approach would most likely ensure that voucher
antidiscrimination laws survive a court challenge.
F. A Brief Comparison
Though each of the above approaches to the free speech problem could
lead a court to uphold antidiscrimination requirements, there are some key
advantages to the government-speech approach (Section II.B) and the
deferential approach (Section II.E). First and most importantly, these
approaches provide a solid analytical framework for upholding not only
antidiscrimination requirements, but basic curricular requirements as well.
They expressly endorse the government's power to favor particular
165. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
166. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673, quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
167. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in Am. Library Ass 'n,
123 S. Ct. at 2304.
168. Am. Library Ass "n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304.
169. Id. (quoting Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673).
170. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 585).
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messages, and thereby provide a rationale for upholding curricular
requirements that are, on their face, both content- and viewpoint-
discriminatory. Unlike antidiscrimination requirements, curricular
requirements cannot be justified without reference to content and
viewpoint.17 Nevertheless they must be upheld; were they not, voucher
programs would be a political impossibility.
Second, the government-speech framework and the deferential
approach would allow for more expansive antidiscrimination policies.
Because the government can exercise direct control over messages, it can
prohibit more than the mere exclusion of protected classes from schools. It
can also ban the teaching of hatred or intolerance (a viewpoint-based
restriction), as Ohio's and Colorado's voucher programs already do. Under
the forum approach and under the heightened scrutiny analyses, these
viewpoint-based restrictions would be difficult to justify. Courts could try
to uphold them under a compelling interest theory, but even this is
problematic, since a finding of viewpoint discrimination normally sounds
the death knell for any law.
Finally, the government-speech and deferential approaches would allow
courts to avoid some legally difficult and politically explosive questions.
For example, courts would not have to confront the tension between
antidiscrimination law and the ban on viewpoint discrimination, and they
would not have to decide whether eradicating antigay discrimination is a
compelling interest.
III. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OBSTACLES
TO ANTIDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENTS
Additional First Amendment issues arise when the private school in
question is a religious institution, since voucher schools might argue that
antidiscrimination provisions burden their free exercise of religion or
involve an impermissible government entanglement with religion. To the
extent that they defend discriminatory policies in their employment of
ministerial teachers (that is, teachers whose job it is to teach the faith),
religious schools will probably succeed in court. The Religion Clauses do
not, however, provide any special protection for religious voucher schools
that discriminate against students or nonministerial staff.
In addressing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause issues raised
by antidiscrimination requirements, it is important to emphasize that there
are no religious classifications being made. Regardless of whether voucher
171. A requirement that schools teach the history of slavery and the Civil War is a content-
based requirement. A requirement that schools teach that slavery was wrong is a viewpoint-based
requirement.
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programs fit the government-speech framework or some other framework,
the antidiscrimination regulations in these programs are facially neutral
toward religion. Regulations that discriminated against religious schools
because of their religious nature would present a different problem and
would probably be unconstitutional under the Establishment, Free Exercise,
and Equal Protection Clauses. 72 Antidiscrimination laws, in contrast, are
neutral, generally applicable policies..
A. Solving the Religion Problem: Free Exercise, Smith, and Hybrid Rights
The Free Exercise Clause does not pose an obstacle to most
antidiscrimination requirements. This is because states are normally not
constitutionally required to provide special accommodations to religious
institutions that exempt them from generally applicable laws.
The widely discussed Smith decision is the obvious focal point in this
analysis. In Employment Division v. Smith, a divided Supreme Court upheld
the government's denial of unemployment benefits to a Native American
employee who was fired for illegal peyote use.17 3 The employee claimed
that the Free Exercise Clause protected his sacramental use of peyote. In
rejecting this claim, the Court emphasized that the law against drug use was
not directed at religion, but was instead a "'valid and neutral law of general
applicability': "[T]he right of free exercise," the Court held, "does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with... '[such a law] on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)." 
74
A straightforward application of Smith to the antidiscrimination
requirements of a voucher program would obviously support a finding that
the requirements are constitutional. Antidiscrimination laws, like the law in
Smith, are not directed at religion, but are "valid and neutral law[s] of
general applicability."'' 75 Two considerations, however, could complicate
Smith's application to a voucher program.
First, the Smith Court explained that the Free Exercise Clause might
work to ban the application of a neutral, generally applicable law if, in
addition to burdening free exercise, the law also interfered with "other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech.' 76 The law at issue
in Smith did "not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim
172. The Supreme Court agreed in May 2003 to consider whether state constitutions that ban
aid to religious schools violate the federal Constitution. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003).
173. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 881.
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unconnected with any communicative activity. '77 This hybrid doctrine
makes little sense as it stands now. If the constitutional right to which a free
exercise claim is attached already requires strict scrutiny on its own-as a
free speech claim might-then it is unclear what role the free exercise claim
would play under a hybrid-rights theory. If neither the free exercise claim
nor the constitutional right to which it is attached is sufficient by itself to
make strict scrutiny necessary, it is difficult to understand why they would
make strict scrutiny necessary when they happen to coincide. If the
explanation is that the other constitutional right is provided a higher degree
of protection when it is religiously motivated, then the doctrine would seem
to put religious actors in a constitutionally favored position, in possible
violation of the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In
any event, if the courts put teeth into Smith's hybrid-rights exception, there
is more than a reasonable possibility that the exception will swallow the
rule. This is because the vast majority of free exercise claims will arguably
contain an expressive component and thus implicate free speech rights.
Countless academics have criticized the hybrid theory, calling it
"difficult to make sense of,' 78 "unintelligible,"'' 79 and "patently
insupportable."'' 80 Some scholars have suggested that the hybrid doctrine
was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing inconvenient precedent in
Smith, and that even in that regard it failed to serve its purpose
convincingly.1 81
Lower courts have been equally perplexed by the hybrid idea, with one
court of appeals commenting diplomatically that the Supreme Court "has
been somewhat less than precise with regard to the nature of hybrid
rights,"1 82 another court of appeals finding it "difficult to delineate the exact
contours of the hybrid-rights theory,'' 83 and a third calling it "completely
illogical.' 84 At least two courts of appeals have openly refused to adopt the
hybrid approach.
185
In those cases in which the lower courts have applied the hybrid theory,
the doctrine itself has not been necessary to the decision. For example, in
cases specifically recognizing free speech/free exercise hybrid claims, the
177. Id. at 882.
178. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 26.
179. Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 119, 120 (2000).
180. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 198, 205 (1990).
181. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121-22 (1990).
182. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Swanson ex rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir.
1998).
184. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
185. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger, 5 F.3d
at 180.
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free speech claims on their own would have been enough to determine the
outcome. 1
86
Given the utter confusion surrounding this area of the law, it is difficult
to know how the hybrid theory would or should be applied to
antidiscrimination requirements for voucher schools. Since the "other" right
asserted in a voucher case would probably be a free speech right, the most
reasonable approach seems to be to analyze the problem under free speech
principles. Even if the free exercise claim gives extra force to the free
speech claim under a hybrid-rights theory, the response of a state seeking to
enforce an antidiscrimination law should be the same compelling interest
argument outlined above in Section II.D. That is, the state should argue that
it has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in education that
justifies the small burden that antidiscrimination regulations impose on a
school's freedom of religion and expressive association.
87
B. Solving the Religion Problem: Free Exercise, the Establishment
Clause, and the Ministerial Exception
One cannot help but hope, of course, that the hybrid doctrine will soon
be put out of its misery and eliminated altogether. If that were to occur and
Smith's central holding were to apply to vouchers, the Religion Clauses
issue would be eliminated almost entirely.
There is still another caveat to consider. Several appellate courts have
held that Smith does not overrule the judicially created exception to
antidiscrimination laws known as the "ministerial exception." The
ministerial exception is a doctrine recognized by several circuits that
"exempts the selection of clergy from Title VII" on both Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause grounds.' 88 In addition to exempting the selection of
clergy, the doctrine has similarly exempted the selection of church
186. See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D. Tex.
1997); Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1334
(E.D. Tex. 1993); see also William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts:
Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 228 (1998)
(finding that in every one of the successful hybrid free speech/free exercise cases published as of
October 1998, the free speech claim "had a sufficient life of its own to warrant" a strict scrutiny
analysis).
187. It is worth noting that in Bob Jones Universit--a pre-Smith decision where the
Supreme Court recognized a compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education-the First Amendment right that the University had claimed was a Free Exercise right,
yet the compelling interest still overrode it. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
604 (1983).
188. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Title VII itself
exempts religious organizations from coverage "with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Exemption from Title
VII's ban on other forms of discrimination has come only in the form of a court-created
ministerial exception.
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employees who, despite not being clergy, nonetheless play a role in
teaching matters of faith or who participate in church governance. 189
Courts have provided various explanations for the exception. The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has found that "[t]he minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose" and that
"[a]n attempt by the government to regulate the relationship between a
church and its clergy would infringe upon the church's right to be the sole
governing body of its ecclesiastical rules and religious doctrine.'' 190
Therefore, even after Smith, applying antidiscrimination law to church
ministers would violate Free Exercise. In addition, "applying Title VII to
the employment relationship between a church and its clergy would involve
'excessive government entanglement with religion' as prohibited by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."'91
The Ninth Circuit has also agreed that the application of Title VII to
church ministers would violate the Establishment Clause. It has noted that a
"church's selection of its own clergy is [a] core matter of ecclesiastical self-
governance,' 92 and that it cannot ".imagine an area of inquiry less suited to
a temporal court for decision."' 1 93 Though their rationales have differed,
many other appeals courts have come to the same ultimate conclusion: The
ministerial exception remains.
194
The exception would allow religious schools to discriminate in the
hiring of clerical teachers who, like ministers, are often engaged in
spreading the faith and conveying the religion's core teachings to students.
Presumably, these schools could discriminate against such teaching staff on
any basis because the courts see themselves as constitutionally barred from
inquiring into the disputes.
But the ministerial exception is not far-reaching. Courts properly limit
the exception to employees whose "primary duties" include "teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship."'1 95 For
employees without such functions, "the particularly strong religious
interests surrounding a church's choice of its representative are missing.''
196
189. Catholic Univ. ofAm., 83 F.3d at 461.
190. Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11 th
Cir. 2000).
191. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
192. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999).
193. Id. at 949 (quoting Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
194. See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Young v. N. 111. Conference of United
Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
195. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.
1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
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As the Ninth Circuit observed, "There is thus no danger that, by allowing
[suits by lay employees] to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts into
the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment on questions of
religious faith or doctrine.
'' 97
Employing the same reasoning, the Fifth Circuit found that the
ministerial exception did not exempt a sectarian Mississippi college from its
obligations to nonministerial teaching faculty under Title VII:
[F]aculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its
congregation. They neither attend to the religious needs of the
faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine. That
faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing
Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their
employment matters of church administration and thus purely of
ecclesiastical concern. 98
A similar rationale should apply to discrimination against students. The
agreement of a student with the church's core doctrines or her ability to
teach them is not normally relevant to her role at the institution. She is there
to receive an education, not to "attend to the religious needs of the faithful"
or "instruct [other] students in the whole of religious doctrine."' 199 Thus, no
religious exception to a voucher antidiscrimination law should be
necessary.
Though it has not done so in the context of ministerial exemptions, the
Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between regulation of churches and
regulation of religious schools. In Bob Jones University, the Court noted
that government interference in the affairs of religious schools was less
constitutionally problematic than interference with churches, because the
schools were not "purely religious institutions" and because the government
had heightened interests in the area of education.200 This reasoning
obviously bolsters the argument for applying antidiscrimination laws to the
admissions practices and nonclerical hiring practices of religious voucher
schools.
In sum, the ministerial exception may preclude states from imposing
antidiscrimination requirements on the clerical hiring decisions of religious
voucher schools. 20 1 Nonetheless, states would probably still be free to
197. Id.
198. EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
199. Id. .
200. Bob Jones Univ..v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983).
201. Yet there is also a possibility that states are not constitutionally permitted to exempt
religious schools from antidiscrimination requirements. For a discussion of these issues in the
context of charitable choice legislation, see Laura B. Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God's)
Will: The Constitutionality of Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 389, 391 (2002).
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require adherence to antidiscrimination norms in the admission of students
and in the hiring of nonministerial staff.
20 2
CONCLUSION
Some might have speculated that the Court's powerful endorsement of
vouchers in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris would move the voucher battle out
of the courts and into the legislatures. As this Note demonstrates, however,
there are still important legal questions to be resolved. The discrimination
question is likely to be one of the most hotly contested of them, and courts
may have difficulty making sense of the doctrine that governs the First
Amendment issues.
In this Note, I have sought to demonstrate that antidiscrimination laws,
as applied to voucher schools, can and should survive a First Amendment
challenge. The Free Speech Clause argument has several prongs. First,
courts should find voucher laws to be Rust-like programs in which the
government speaks through private actors. In such cases, the state may
make value judgments and distinguish among viewpoints without having its
decisions subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. Second,
even if courts find that voucher programs are not analogous to Rust but
instead resemble a nonpublic or limited public forum, antidiscrimination
requirements should be deemed a reasonable restriction on that forum.
Furthermore, if the antidiscrimination policies are subjected to heightened
scrutiny, they still can and should survive. Finally, even if the policies are
deemed viewpoint-discriminatory, they can be upheld under the deferential
approach of American Library Ass 'n.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the free exercise problems raised
by voucher antidiscrimination policies are less difficult to address. Smith
made clear that the Free Exercise Clause does not provide an exemption
202. Mark Tushnet discusses the possibility of an additional Establishment Clause problem.
He explains that antidiscrimination requirements may lead to unconstitutional "sect preferences."
Because some schools "will refuse to participate in programs with conditions inconsistent with
their faith commitments," they will not benefit from the voucher program to the same extent as
other schools with different faith commitments. In Tushnet's view, this may amount to
government preference among sects in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Tushnet, supra
note 2, at 28.
I believe that Tushnet exaggerates the Establishment Clause problem. Voucher
antidiscrimination policies are facially neutral-not only "as between religiously affiliated schools
and secular ones," id., but also as among various religions. Tushnet does not adequately take
account of this second form of neutrality. Moreover, the incidental disparate impact that the
antidiscrimination policies have on some religions is no different from the disparate impact that
any law has on religious groups that disagree with it. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has
analyzed such laws under the Free Exercise Clause, not the Establishment Clause, and it has not
subjected such laws to strict scrutiny. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Tellingly, Tushnet does not cite any court precedent in this section of his Establishment Clause
argument. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 27-28.
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from neutral laws of general applicability, and antidiscrimination laws
unquestionably fit into this category of law. There are only two caveats.
First, discriminatory religious schools might raise "hybrid" free speech/free
exercise claims. Such claims have not prevailed in the courts, however,
when the free speech claim was not sufficient to determine the case on its
own. Second, the ministerial exception will make inquiries into religious
employment decisions impossible, but this exception will not-and should
not-protect a school's right to discriminate against students or
nonministerial faculty and staff.
While civil rights groups should certainly be troubled by the current
lack of comprehensive antidiscrimination protections in voucher legislation,
they should not assume that vouchers will necessarily lead to state-funded
discrimination protected by the Constitution. The weight of precedent
supports the states' power to prohibit discrimination in voucher schools.
The "right" to discriminate may not be as expansive as many fear it to be.
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